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I INTRODUCTION 
The Companies Act - 1993 which came into force on 1 July 1994 has 
introduced a sense of statuto1y duty to directors and officers which until now 
has been left to the principles of common law. The commencement of this 
Act states as one of its objectives, 
7'o encourage efficient and re.sponsible Management of 
Companies by a//011•ing directors a wide discretion in matters 
of business judgement 1Fhile at the same lime providing 
protection.from shareholders and creditors against the abuse 
o.fmanagemenr po11•er. 
This paper examines the general duties of a director under the Companies Act 
1993 devoting special attention to the duty of care provisions of the Act in 
sections 13 7 and 138 in association with section 130. It attempts a 
comparison between the common law as it has been developed through the 
years since the landmark decision of Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Company Ltd 119241 and analyses if a more or less stringent 
regime of care is owed by a director under the Companies Act 1993. 
There has been much controversy about section 13 7 and the quantum of care 
required of directors. Some commentators believe nothing has changed and 
that the Act only reinforces the common law. Others believe there is a 
significant increase in the standard of care. This paper is intended to analyse 
on a transactional basis what the outcome would be under the Act. 
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II BACKGROUND AND ORlGINS OF DUTY OF CARE 
PROVISIONS 
One of the prime reasons which spmTed the Law Commission to make 
recommendations for a new Act was the subject of directors' duties. The 
Companies Act 1955 was silent on this topic and duties of directors could 
only be detem1ined by reference to previous decisions of the comts. This 
was found to be unsatisfact01y in terms of defining the law. 
Prior to the enactment of the Act the Bill as it was first introduced to 
Parliament1 consisted of the provision that the director was not only required 
to exercise the care, diligence and skill of the reasonable director, but also the 
requirement in the case of a director in a profession or occupation or 
possessing specialist skills or knowledge that he or she exercises the care 
diligence and skill that a reasonable director in that profession or occupation 
or possessing those special skills or knowledge would exercise in the same 
circumstances 2. 
Upon introduction of this provision the Parliamentaiy Select Committee met 
with opposition from the professions themselves arguing that professionals 
Companies Bill as reported from the Justice and Law Reform Committee 
December 1992 . 
Above n I, Section l I 5 (2) . 
J 
3 
would shy away from company directorships if such a requirement were to 
be legislated. The select committee heeded to these submissions, hence the 
introduction of the cunent section 137 replacing the st:Iicter provisions of the 
earlier Bill. What was introduced in replacement is commonly known as the 
Awa qualifications which requires the director to exercise the care, diligence 
and skill that a reasonable director would exercise in the same circumstances 
taking into consideration such things as the nature of the company, nature of 
the decision, the position of the director and the nature of the responsibilities 
unde1taken by him or her3. The move away from the higher standard of care 
int:t·oduced in the miginal Bill although not diluting the serious nature of the 
responsibilities owed to the company by a director, ce1tainly makes a 
difference in the standard of care required of the professional director. 
However there is much debate about whether the section 13 7 requirement is 
more onerous on the director than the standards set by the common law since 
Re City Equitable~ and applied in eve1y instance where directors duties 
have been examined in ew Zealand. 
The select committee also recognised the need for directors to rely on 
info1mation, opinions and repmts prepared by officers, expe1ts or committees 
of the board. The law commission draft followed the No1th American model 
in introducing section 138 which provides for such reliance provided the 
Companies Act I 993 Sectio n 137 . 
(1924) 1 Ch 407 . 
4 
directors act in good faith , and make inqui1y when the need for inqui1y is 
indicated and had no knowledge that such reliance is unwananted. 
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III INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 137 GENERALLY 
Section 137 of the Companies Act 1993 provides that 
A director of a company, when exercising powers or performing 
d11ties as a director, 11111st exercise the care, diligence and skill that a 
reasonable director 11 •cmld exercise in the same circ11111stances taking 
into acco11nt, b11t ll'itho11t limitation. 
(a) The nature qf' the company; and 
(b) The nature of the decision; and 
(c) 'J'he position qf' the director and the nat11re of the 
responsibilities 11ndertaken by him or her. 
The words "reasonable director" appear to set a distant and objective standard 
for the person described in the section. Yet fmiher on in the section it talks 
of the person in the "same circumstances" and goes on further to say that the 
circumstances of the person's position, nature of responsibilities unde1iaken 
by the person in relation to the nature of the company and the nature of the 
decision should be taken account of 
The words "same circumstances" b1ings in a subjective element to the section 
and dilutes the objective standard set by the words "reasonable director". To 
say the least this is very ambiguous and leaves the section up in the air with 
no conclusive standar~ in sight. The section also requires taking into 
consideration the following: 
6 
(a) The nature ql the company and 
(b) The nature qj' the decision and 
(c) The position of the director and nature of responsibihties: 5 
Again the subjective element is being manifested in these three qualifying 
circumstances which further exacerbates the ambiguities of the section. 
These are known as the Awa qualifications refening to the judgement of 
Rogers CJ in Awa V Deloite Haskins and Sells. 
6 
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IV RE CITY EQUITABLE FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD 
[192411 CHANCERY DIVISION 407- 532 
The examination of directors duties have been frequently the task before the 
Courts and the decision of Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance 
Company Ltd6 stands out as the foremost authority on this subject. In these 
proceedings Romer J delivered his judgment on the issue of whether the 
directors were properly discharging their duties that they owed to the 
company's shareholders during the misfeasance of the chief executive. The 
official receiver alleged that they were not. Whilst admitting that they had 
acted honestly throughout he maintained they were still guilty of such 
negligence, as to render themselves liable to the company in damages. The 
al1egations against the directors were claims in negligence, breach of tTust 
and breach of duty . In Romer J's judgement directors duties are often 
summarised by commentators as being 
• A Director must act honestly 
• A Director must exercise reasonable care an ordina1y man might be 
expected to take on his own behalf 
• A Director must give attention to a company's affairs although such 
attention may be intennittent and he or she is not obliged to attend all 
meetings .7 
Above n4 . 
See J Hodder "Corporate Management and Directors' Duties" Coopers and 
Lybrand and Chapman Tripp Sheffield Young joint seminar paper. 
9 
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This is often viewed as a lenient standard. It is submitted that while the 
different interpretations of Romer J's decision have always conveyed his 
judgement as being a relaxed standard expected of a director as opposed to 
the standard of care required under the Common law of Negligence, Romer 
J did make some higher standard of care rulings which he only put aside due 
to the existence of Atticle 150 in the City Equitable Company's Atticles of 
Association. He said at the conclusion of his judgement: 8 
B11tfor the J 50th oft he articles of association, I sho11ld in my 
j11dgement have to hold the respondent directors liable in 
varying degrees for the loss to the company that might have 
been prevented. 
Article 150 of the City Equitable Company's ruticles of association provided: 9 
No Directors, A 11ditors, Secretary or other offtcersfor the time 
being should be answerable for the acts, receipts, neglects, or 
defaults qf"the others or other of them, or.for any bankers or 
other persons 11 •ith whom any moneys or effects belonging to 
the company sho11ld be placed 0111 or invested orfor any other 
loss, mi~fort11ne or damage 111hich might happen in the 
execution c?f' their respective c?fftces or trusts, or in relation 
thereto, unless the same should happen by or through their 
011·n wi(fit! neglect or de.fault respectively. 
Above n4 , 474 
Above n4 , 413 . 
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Romer Jin his analysis of the words "Wilful Neglect" 10, said that an act or 
an omission to do an act is wilful where the person knows what he is doing 
and intends to do what he is doing. But if that act or omission amounts to a 
breach of his duty and therefore to negligence is the person guilty of 
negligence? Romer J said unless the person knows he is committing and 
intends to commit a breach of his duty it could not amount to wilful 
negligence . 
It is submitted that in the City Equitable judgement, Romer J is influenced to 
great an extent by the A1iicle 150 which is derived from the UK Companies 
Legislation 11 of the time when the action came before the Comis. An 
equivalent of this aiiicle was not provided for in the New Zealand Companies 
Act 1955 or its predecessors . Hence the Directors in City Equitable could 
well have been in breach of their duties to the shareholders of the company 
under New Zealand law, as Romer J only found them to be not "wilfully 
negligent" . The City Equitable judgement will be dealt with on a 
transactional basis in the discussion following, fonning the basis for the 
decision if directors duties specified in section 13 7 in association with 
section 138 and section 130 of the Companies Act 1993 require a different 
standard of care than what the common law has required up to now. 
10 Above n4 , 434 . 
11 Companies Consolidation Act, 1908 8 Edw, 7. C. 69. 
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V THE LAW AS APPLIED IN CITY EQUITABLE 
In laying down the principles of law applicable to directors duties Romer J 
alluded to the fact that directors have sometime been considered to be in a 
fiduciruy relationship to a company. However he was sympathetic to the fact 
that different directors would have different standards of care applicable such 
as an insurance company director would have different obligations to a 
director of a bank A director of a small company may have different 
responsibilities in attending to most of the activities himself as opposed to a 
director of a larger company where certain matters are dealt with by the 
management and staff Romer J said that in order to asce1tain the duties of 
a director it was necessaiy to consider: 12 
Not only the nature qf the company's business, but also the manner in 
1t1hich the 111ork of the company is distributed be/ltleen the directors 
and the other officials of the company, provided always that this 
distribution is a reasonable one in the circumstances, and is not 
inconsistent ll'ith any express provisions of the articles of association. 
In discharging the duties qfhis position thus ascertained, a director 
must cfcourse act honestly. 
Romer J went on to analyse the law saying that although it has been said in 
the past that as long as a director acts honestly he cannot be made 
12 Above n4 ,427 . 
11 
responsible in damages unless guilty of gross or culpable negligence, he felt 
that one could not say whether a person had been guilty of negligence, gross 
or otherwise unless the extent of the duty itself can be dete1mined. One had 
to know the extent of the duty that has been neglected. 13 Romer J was 
referring to Neville J's analysis in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and 
Estates. 14 
Romer J also compared the difference between ordinaiy negligence and gross 
negligence in detennining what standard of care was required from the 
director. He said if a Director has to be proved to be grossly negligent a 
director did not owe a duty to the company to give all possible cai·e. He 
refened to what Neville J had quoted in re Brazilian Rubber Plantations in 
saying a director owes to a company "reasonable care" to be measured by the 
cai·e an ordinaiy man might be expected to take on his own behalf. He went 
on to conclude that directors could not be liable for mere enors of judgment. 
This summaiy of the law in general by Romer J has been accepted as the law 
applicable in the assessment of directors duties ever since Re City Equitable . 
Romer J applied these principles to the facts of the City Equitable 
transactions which will be discussed in the ensuing pages. 
13 Above n11 . 
1-1 [1911] l Ch425 ,437 . 
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VI STANDARDS OF CARE -A COMPARISON 
The weight of the burden of care in the City Equitable context would need 
to be examined as against section 137. 
The standards would be: 
DIRECTORS STANDARD OF CARE 
I 
COMMON LAW 
CITY EQUITABLE 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
To exercise reasonable care 
an ordinmy man might 
exercise on his own behalf 
Not bound to give 
continuous attention to the 
affairs of the company. 
In the absence of suspicion 
may trust an official to 
perforn1 his duties honestly . 
I 
COMPANIES ACT - 1993 
SECTION 137 
To exercise the care of a 
reasonable director in the 
same circumstances taking 
into consideration 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
The nature of the 
company 
The nature of the 
decision 
The position and 
responsibilities 
unde1iaken by the 
director. 
I 
13 
VII CITY EQUITABLE TRANSACTION A - OVERPAYMENT OF 
COMMISSION 
A Facts 
The general manager of the City Equitable Fire Insurance Company had a 
large sum of money advanced to him by the company, which sum was 
unsecured and never paid back as at date of the company's liquidation. 15 
This unsecured loan was actually a disguise for a buildup of unauthorised 
commission payments for which several cheques were placed before the 
directors of the company at regular meetings which were all signed without 
question by the directors . In the three year period in question in Re City 
Equitable 154 cheques were signed by the directors amounting to £110,000 
in payments to the general manager. 
The usual procedure in the company where a note accompanying each 
cheque would be prepared stating the amount and pmµose of the cheque with 
a statement such as "authorised for payment at board meeting of (date)," had 
not been followed . orn1ally a list would also be prepared of all cheques 
stating the names of payees, amount of cheques and pmµose of each cheque 
which would be ratified at each board meeting. This practice had suddenly 
ceased, the list would only state each amount of the cheque without payee 
names or pmµose of requirement. The list itself was gradually omitted for 
15 Above n4 , 448 . 
14 
presentation at the board meetings but merely went to the company 
secretaiy's depaitment and got transcribed as a whole amount for which 
cheques were required into the agenda book. At the meeting the board would 
resolve that cheques be drawn to the amount stated in the agenda book and 
each cheque was signed by any two directors that were present. None of 
these unauthorised amended procedures were questioned by the directors at 
the regular board meetings . 
B Findings 
Romer J in considering these facts said that as regards the cheque amounts 
a director must of necessity h·ust to the officials of the company to pe1f01m 
honestly and properly the duties allocated to them. He said that no single 
cheque amount exceeded what a director might reasonably consider to be 
properly payable to the employee on account of or in anticipation of 
commission . As regards the duties owed to the company by one of the 
directors who was also a member of the finance sub committee, Romer J said 
although the frequency of the cheques did raise some difficulty, he was 
prepared to excuse him on the ground that there was no ostensible reason for 
this director to have kept a list of all the cheques he signed, as this would 
have been far outside the duty owed by a director to a company and quite 
impractical. Hence Romer J concluded that a director only unde1takes to 
bting to the service of the company a mem01y of a normally impeifect nature 
implying the prudence of an ordinaiy man. 
15 
In the foregoing set of facts Romer J found that directors could quite rightly 
rely on company officials with regard to preparation of cheques. However 
despite this finding he went on fu11her to consider the directors 
responsibilities with regard to the unauthorised amendment of procedures by 
the company officials for cheque payments which not one of the directors 
had questioned. 
The alteration in procedures was where the nonnal list which would be 
prepared containing names of payees and amounts of each cheque was not 
being produced at board meetings anymore, but the total amount of payments 
for which cheques were required would be tr·anscribed in the agenda book. 
Romer J held that although the directors could be freed from liability for their 
individual signing of the cheques in the circumstances, a major procedural 
lapse had occuned, in that he found that a board resolution should have 
auth01ised each cheque payment by way of a total list of all cheques. He said 
such authority from the board was necessaty and although some precaution 
was being exercised in this case, all cheque amounts were lumped together 
as an aggregate amount on which the board resolved at each meeting. This 
rendered the precaution useless. Romer J went on to say that if a proper list 
of cheques were read out at each meeting and subsequently tr·anscribed into 
the minutes of the meeting which would have been circulated prior to board 
meetings all the overpayment of commission cheques would have come to 
light and the frequency of the payments to the general manager would have 
been detected . 
16 
Romer J concluded with a finding of near negligence in the words: 16 
... .... Whether the omission of the respondent directors to follow the 
proper practice in giving authority for the signing of cheques 
constituted negligence on their part may be a question of some 
dffficulty. But tf ii l1'CIS negligence ii lflas not lfli(ful negligence ......... . 
It is again significant that Romer J was restricted to a certain degree by 
Article 150 of the company's a1iicles. 
Romer J also questioned the representations of the overpayments lumped 
together as "loans at call or sho1t notice" in the balance sheet for the years in 
question . He held that any director whose duty it was to inquire as to loans 
owing to this company would have discovered, or be deemed to have 
discovered the existence of the loans to the general manager. 
It is therefore submitted that the City Equitable standard of care as decided 
by Romer J in relation to the transaction of overpayment of commissions 
went beyond the common interpretation given to the City Equitable facts i.e. 
the ordina1y man standard. Romer J's decision expounds the fact that the 
directors needed to act more responsibly regarding the unauthorised 
amendment of company procedures in relation to approving cheque payments 
in general. 
16 Above 114, 460. 
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VIII APPLICATJON OF SECTION 137 TO TRANSACTION A -
CITY EQUITABLE 
The findings of Romer J on the facts related above with regard to the 
overpayments to the general manager could be summed up as 
1. Directors cannot be expected to keep note of each and eve1y cheque 
signed by each of them as this would be outside the prudence of an 
ordinaiy human being 
2. Directors should take responsibility to resolve at each board meeting 
their approval to the list of cheques being signed each time. 
3. Directors should satisfy themselves as to the reported figures in the 
balance sheets of the company. 
An application of section 13 7 to the above facts in Re City Equitable may on 
the face of it appear to convey that directors would be required to show a 
much higher standard of care than what has been the usual interpretation of 
Romer J's findings ie that City Equitable required the directors to only bring 
18 
the rnern01y of a norn1al human being17 to the boardroom whereas section 
137 would require the director to have acted as a "reasonable director". 
However as submitted previously City Equitable goes beyond the ordinaiy 
man standard in requuing the directors to pay heed to boardroom procedures 
and give closer attention to figures repo1ted in the annual accounts and only 
relieved the directors of liability due to the existence of Atticle 150. 18 
Would the outcome be any different under section 13 7? 
Under section 137 a Director is required to exercise the care, diligence and 
skill of a reasonable Director in the same circumstances taking into 
consideration 
1. The nature of the company 
2. The nature of the decision 
3. The position and nature of responsibilities unde1taken by the Director. 
Dealing first with the nature of the company in a large company such as City 
Equitable which was a thriving fire and general business with a progressive 
17 Above n4,458 " or can J think that a director fails in his duty by reason oflapses 
of memory that are in the circumstances reasonably excusable. He only 
undertakes to bring to the service of the company a memory of the normally 
imperfect nature, a'.1d Mr Grenside's memory would appear to have been of this 
order" Romer J. 
18 See above pp7,8. 
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trading profit and increasing premium income in the years in question it 
would be easily justified that the nature of the company required the directors 
of the company to delegate the day to day rnnning of the business to the 
officials of the company. Also that the directors could rely on them for 
efficient management of the company without too many oversight obligations 
from directors. 
As regards the second qualifier (nature of the decision) firstly in relation to 
the decision of cheque amounts it was not a decision that could have put the 
directors on inqui1y. It was not a decision that nonnally requires closer 
scmtiny and it would be usual to treat such a decision as a routine matter. 
The section 137 outcome could well be similar to Romer J's findings. 
However, the decision in regard to altered practices in presenting cheques for 
signature to the board, would require more attention under section 137. The 
decision would be a more serious one to which under section 137 the board 
will be required to pay more attention. Again Romer J's conclusion was 
similar. 
As for the nature and responsibilities unde11aken by the directors in the City 
Equitable context, Romer J tended to h·eat the directors of the main board 
less severely than the directors represented on the finance sub committee. 
Section 137 together with section 138 pennits directors to place reliance on 
20 
employees and committees of directors etc 19 provided the director acts in 
good faith and has no knowledge that such reliance is unwananted and makes 
proper inqui1y when the need for inqui1y is indicated by the circumstances. 
Hence it is possible that the application of sections 137 and 138 would 
coincide with Romer J's treatment of more severity to directors of the board 
who were also on the finance committee rather than all board members. 
Romer Jin discussing the involvement of the directors said they were not all 
involved to the extent that each director would have attended eve1y board 
meeting. Each director was involved in vaiying degrees: 
Lord March -
Mr Milligan -
Due to se1ious illness could only attend two meetings in 
the three year pe1iod under question and had offered to 
resign his directorship but was persuaded by his 
colleagues to remain. 
Canied on business in Aberdeen and could only attend 
few Board Meetings. 
Haig Thomas and Herny Grenside were businessmen of repute and were 
members of the finance sub committee as well as the main board. 
Additionally Grenside was a solicitor with a vast business clientele. They 
19 New Zealand Companies Legislation, Chapman Tripp Sheffield Young, 
pp3 I 3 004 ,3 13 l 51 . 
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were both appointed to the finance committee together with the chairman and 
chief executive. 
Section 137 on the other hand may not provide a defence to a director who 
lives in Aberdeen and cannot attend board meetings regularly. Yet liability 
that attached to such a director could differ from the liability attaching to the 
directors in the finance sub committee who undertake ostensible 
responsibility for the investments of the company generally. 
The words "position and nature of responsibilities undertaken by the director" 
is very wide tenninology which leaves the discretion as to the duties 
unde1taken to the director himself, rather than stating something similar to the 
words "duties and responsibilities imposed on the directors" . Hence section 
137 appears to fix the duty of care coITesponding to the duties undertaken by 
the director at the director's discretion, almost on a contractual basis. This 
again introduces a subjective element which offsets the distant standard of 
the "reasonable director" in the same section. Even if a "reasonable director" 
in n01mal parlance would point to someone more astute (i.e. an experienced 
professional director) than an ordinary man as applied by Romer J the 
"reasonable director" is being given some comfort in the qualifying 
circwnstances provided by the Companies Act 1993 which standard appears 
to coincide to a large extent with the ordina1y man standard applied in this 
transaction A in Re City Equitable. 
22 
David O Jones in his account on director's duties20 suggests that the 
requirements in relation to the director's duty of care under the Companies 
Act 1993 is not that of a reasonably "careful" director but the care of a 
reasonable director who he infers as satisfying the requirements of an 
"ordinary man as applied by Romer Jin City Equitable. 
Use of the expression "same circumstances" is of some significance 
for ii introduces a su~/ective approach lo consideration of the 
standard expected of directors. The circumstances which must be 
considered are exactly those facing the director under scrutiny and 
not circumstances 1l'hich distance the decision making from the 
director. This o.ff~els the oNective connotation 1l'hich arise from the 
use c?f'the term "reasonable director" and supports the interpretation 
that a "reasonable director" does not mean a reasonably ski/fit! 
person or director. 21 
It is therefore submitted that section 13 7 does not convey in unambiguous 
terms what duty of care is required of the director. It appears to be a 
hotchpotch of dual or multiple standards which the courts are left to interpret 
in due course. It must be noted however that when before the comi the 
expert reasonable director could well appear to give evidence (with the 
benefit of hindsight) that he or she as a reasonable director would have acted 
20 David O Jones II A guide to the Companies Act 1993 11 Butterworths 1993 
Above 1120, 121 21 
23 
differently. This again makes the standard of care required from a director 
open ended and undefined . 
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IX CITY EQUITABLE TRANSACTION B - CUSTODY OF 
INVESTMENT MONrES 
A Facts 
The firm of investment brokers acting for the company had in their hands 
from time to time large sums of money belonging to the company over which 
not one director of the board exercised any control and in respect of which 
no account was ever asked for or seen by any of the directors. 22 
Originally an advance of monies to the brokers was authorised by way of a 
resolution of the finance sub committee of the board to the effect that a loan 
would be granted for the sum of £30,000 against securities to be lodged with 
the company with a 10% margin by the brokers. One of the directors recalled 
that this loan was later increased to £200,000. However in reality this sum 
had increased significantly at the broker's own initiative without any of the 
directors being aware . This was only made possible as there were always 
large sums of unsupervised monies in the hands of the brokers. These 
monies were de1ived from , the sale of the company's investments caJTied out 
by the brokers on behalf of the company. They did send accounts of their 
dealings to the company, but it only went as far as the accounts division of 
the company, none of the directors had any oppmtunity to sight these 
purpo1ied accounts . 
22 Above n4, 46 1 to 474 
25 
Due to these slack procedures in the company the chief executive of the 
company who was also a partner of the same broker fom could take 
advantage of the situation and was able to deal as he thought fit with the 
available cash resources that were not required for investment decided by the 
finance sub committee. If he wanted a few more thousand pounds for his 
own purposes of the monies reposing in the hands of the brokers (the 
existence of which he would quite easily become aware of as he was a 
partner in the firm of brokers) , he only had to direct the accountant of the 
company to debit his finn's loan account with the sum required and it would 
promptly get done. Hence it was not surprising that the authorised loan of 
£30,000 to the finn of brokers had swelled to £720,000 at the date of 
commencement of the liquidation proceedings. 
As far as the board were concerned they thought that the finance committee 
was looking after all investments and therefore believed the control of monies 
whether in pennanent or tempormy investment, were all being looked after 
by this committee. However two of the directors who were also members of 
the finance committee were of a different impression, i.e. that the finance 
committee was only responsible for the permanent investments of the 
company and that the chief executive and the general manager of the 
company were responsible for the tempora1y investment of the company's 
funds . As a result of this chaotic misapprehension of responsibilities by 
members of the board the monies not in pe1manent investment were able to 
be totally mishandled by the chief executive without inqui1y from the board 
of directors . 
26 
An example of this was when the finance committee decided to reduce the 
company's aggregate holdings in industrial securities and the chief executive 
was authorised to sell ce11ain holdings, the proceeds of which was to be 
invested in government bills in due course. Accordingly various sales were 
carried out by the firm of brokers at the chief executive's behest following 
which the cash in their hands on investment account was over £550,000. By 
means of entering a perfectly fictitious purchase of treasmy bills and war 
bonds and by an unauthmised transfer to loan account, the balance shown as 
cash in the hands of the brokers was reduced to £73,650 in the company's 
books. In reality the entire sum of £550,000 remained uninvested in the 
hands of the brokers down to the date of liquation . National war bonds and 
treasmy bills purported to have been bought were never delivered to the 
company, ultimately never being questioned by any of the directors . 
What had in fact happened at the instigation of the chief executive was that 
following the finance committee resolution to divest itself of its investments 
in industrial securities, the chief executive instrncted the brokers to sell 
nearly £320,000 worth of securities to a syndicate of which the chief 
executive himself was (possibly) the sole member. Sho1tly afterwards these 
securities were purpo1tedly resold to the company without authority which 
reduced the brokers account balance by £319,517. The proceeds of this 
pretended resale was credited to the brokers account much later. The balance 
due from the brokers in spite of them being credited with the proceeds of the 
re-sale of secmities was shown on the company's books at the lower level of 
£50,000 which was made possible by the chief executive appropriating 
£190,000 for the purpose of investing in a Brazilian ranch and £40,000 in 
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shares of the company, United Brass Founders, in both cases without the 
knowledge or authority of his associate directors. Finally when it became 
obvious to the chief executive that the brokers' indebtedness could no longer 
be concealed, at his behest the brokers fom unloaded a number of doubtful 
securities on the company and debited the company with a further large 
conttibution to the Brazilian ranch. Due to this and some other fictitious cash 
payments to the company the amount due from the fom of brokers both on 
loan and investment account had disappeared and in fact the company's books 
showed an amount of£ 13,950 as being owed to the brokers! In actual fact 
the monies owing from the brokers was £720,000, the collateral security held 
by the company realised £30,859! ! 
B Findings 
On the foregoing facts Romer J held that the advancing of monies not 
immediately required by the company for cunent business purposes or 
pe1manent investment if made upon adequate security was a legitimate 
method of employing the company's funds and there was no reason why such 
an advance should not be made. There was no evidence to prove that either 
of the directors was aware or should be aware that there was insufficient 
cover of secmity for the loan at anytirne when intervention on his part could 
have served any useful purpose. 
In response to the defence that the directors were not aware that the finance 
sub committee had the task of overseeing the tempora1y investment of the 
company as well as the long term investments Romer J held that the facts of 
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the case put before him showed that the finance committee was responsible 
for all investments generally. He said it was the duty of each director to see 
that the company's monies are from time to time in a proper state of 
investment. Romer J was of the view that the directors who were on the 
board but not a patt of the finance committee were justified in delegating this 
general duty to the finance committee. However the two members who were 
main board directors as well as a patt of the finance committee were 
negligent of their duties to think that the chief executive and the general 
manager were responsible for these investments. Romer J said that the 
shareholders had elected six or seven other directors to be associated with the 
chaitman and chief executive and it was not for these other directors to leave 
the chief executive to discharge one of the most impmtant of the duties that 
had been entrusted by the shareholders to the board as a whole, however 
reasonable and however safe. He held that the two directors were in breach 
of theiT duties in failing to control and safeguard the monies of the company 
that were not in a state of pennanent investment. He said if they felt that the 
finance committee were not responsible for the tempora1y investments then 
they should possibly have thought that the whole board was, not just the chief 
executive and general manager of the company. 
Although holding that the rest of the directors outside the finance committee 
were not responsible for seeing that the monies of the company were in a 
proper state of investment as that task was properly delegated to the finance 
committee, Romer J held that all the directors were collectively responsible 
for the losses occasioned by the improper way in which the chief executive 
was actually able to dispose of those monies so far as such disposition came 
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to their notice or would have come to their notice had they made proper 
enqumes. 
He went on to find that all the directors of the board although justified in 
t:msting to the finance committee to perf01m properly the duties delegated to 
them, they still had a duty to inquire as to the making of a rep01t to the 
company in general meeting as to the state of the company's affairs. He said 
that the amount recommended to be paid in dividend to the shareholders was 
a duty of the board of directors as a whole and not the finance committee 
alone . 
Romer J held that it was the duty of each director to have inquired and 
obtained a list of the company's assets or investments for the purposes of 
scrutinising the balance sheets of the company in each year. He held that 
such a list would have shown in detail all the investments that were lumped 
together under general headings in the balance sheet. He said each director 
might then have fo1med some idea as to whether the total sum brought in as 
the value of investments under each general heading was justified for the 
general purposes of the balance sheet and for the specific purpose of the 
dividend that was being recommended. Romer J concluded that had the 
directors made or caused such inqui1ies to be made especially as to the items 
that appeared in the balance sheet as "loans at call or sho1t notice" under 
which headings the loans to the general manager and the advance to the fom 
of brokers was included, a considerable sum of money might have been saved 
to the company. Romer J held that in not making or causing to be made these 
inquiiies the respondent directors had failed to come up to the strict standard 
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of their duty. He concluded that the directors did less than what the law 
required of them as to the extent of their duty. He summed up on the 
director's duty of care with regard to the facts smTounding the loss of 
investment monies in the words: 23 
When presenting the annual report and balance sheet to their 
shareholders, and 1l'hen recommending the declaration of a dividend 
directors ought not to be safl.~fied as to the value of their company's 
assets merely by the assurances of their chairman, ...... nor with the 
expression cf the beliefc?f"an auditor as competent and trustworthy as 
. . . . . . As J have alreac61 stated a list of the company's assets should 
have been prepared, and this 11•as never done. But for the J 50th 
article c?l association 1 should in my judgement have to hold the 
respondent directors liable in ,,arying degrees for the loss to the 
company that might hal'e been prevented had such a list been called 
for on the occasion c?f"the Ct(Jproval by the board of the balance sheets 
fortheyears /9/9, 1920and 1921 .... 
....... The other re.spondenl directors, h011·ever are relieved from 
liability hy reason ol the article, .fcJr 1 am quite sati.~fled that they 
erred in per/eel good.faith and in ignorance of 1Fha1 was their duty to 
the com(Jany in this re.,pect. 24 
Above n9 . 
Above n23 . 
31 
Romer J was in the above circumstances applying the law as in the Common 
Law of Negligence whereby he interpreted the director's duty to be that of 
looking beyond what was being presented by the company's officials and the 
company's auditor as the rep01ted amounts in the balance sheets. He was not 
applying the lenient standard of "gross negligence" as interpreted earlier in 
the paper i.e. he was not saying the director was not required to take all 
possible care. The standard of care applied by Romer J was under the Law 
of Negligence per se, however he was obliged to be attentive to the 
company's a1ticles which imposed a more lenient standard of "wilful 
negligence". 
It is however submitted that the "Wilful egligence" standard applied by 
Romer J was not as lenient as the ,.,Gross egligence" standard as analysed 
earlier on in the case. 25 Under the latter standard Romer J said refeITing to 
Neville Jin Overend and Gurney Co v Gibb: 26 
25 
26 
Whether or not the directors exceeded the po11'ers entrusted to them 
or 11'hether [/'they did not so exceed their poll'ers they were cognisant 
of circumstances cf.rnch a character, so plain, so man[fest and so 
simple cf appreciation, that no men 1t1ilh any ordinary degree of 
See above p8 . 
LR5 H.L.480 . 
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prudence acting on their mm beha(f would have entered into such a 
transaction as they entered into?r 
Whereas under a standard of wilful negligence Romer J said the word 
"wilful" in a,ticle 150 did not qualify a director's liability for negligence . He 
said "that an act or an omission to do an act is wilful where the person knows 
what he is doing (or not doing) and intends in so doing (or not doing)". 28 
It was only under this standard of wilful negligence that the directors of the 
board were absolved of liability in the circumstances described above. 
27 
28 
Above 114,428 . 
Above 114,434 
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X APPLICATION OF SECTfON 137 TO TRANSACTION B -
CITY EQUITABLE 
Romer J's findings in transaction B could be summarised as: 
1. The board of directors were justified in delegating the task of 
investments generally to the finance committee. 
2. Members of the finance committee could not be justified in leaving 
the function of tempora1y investment to the chief executive and 
general manager of the company. 
3. The directors were collectively responsible for allowing the slack 
procedure in safeguarding tempora1y cash resources of the company. 
4. The directors should each be responsible to inquire into the balance 
sheet figures repmted each year by company officials and the 
auditors. They should obtain for scrutiny a list of the company's 
assets/investments in each year for this purpose. 
The collective responsibility of the board for h·ansactions involving 
committees of the board and employees and officials of the company was 
being assessed by Romer J in the facts related above. 
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Section 138 of the Companies Act 1993 focuses on this aspect of the duty of 
care required from directors. Section 138 says: 
Section 138 (J) 
A director qf a company, when exercising powers or per.forming 
duties as a director, may rely on reports, statements and.financial 
data and other in.fhrmation prepared or supplied, and on professional 
or expert ad,•ice, by any of the.following persons. 
a. An employee of the company 1t'hom the director believes on 
reasonable ground\· to be reliable and competent in relation to 
the maffers concerned: 
b. A prcfessiona/ adviser or expert in relation to matters which 
the director beliel'es on reasonable grounds· to be within the 
person's professional or expert competence: 
c. Any other director or commiffee of directors upon which the 
director did not serve in relation to maffers within the 
directors or commiffee's designated authority. 
Section 138 (2) 
Subsection(}) of this section applies to a director only ff the director 
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a. Acts in goodfaith and 
b. Makes proper inquiry where the needfor inq11iry is indicated 
by the circ11mstances: and 
c. Has no knoil'!edge that s11ch reliance is 11nwarranted 
In the City Equitable context section 138 (1) (c) pe1mits reliance on a 
committee of directors and section 138 (1) (a) pennits reliance on employees 
of the company. Thus the directors of the board could rely on the finance 
committee to take responsibility for investments generally. Such reliance 
would also be justified on the ground that the finance committee was made 
up of ve1y reputable and well qualified persons. It is fair to say that the 
reliance was being placed in good faith and a need for inqui1y had not arisen 
and nor was there any need for suspicion that such reliance was not 
wananted. Thus the qualifications under section 138 (2) are being satisfied 
to a large extent with regard to the duty of care owed by the board as a 
whole. 
Romer J was however, treating with more seve1ity the extent of care required 
from members of the finance committee in comparison with the rest of the 
board with regard to the decision of tempormy investments of the company. 
As he understood the facts, investments per se had been delegated to the 
finance committee. He held that the two directors of the finance committee 
had neglected their duty in assuming that the finance committee was only 
responsible for permanent investments and that the chief executive and 
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general manager of the company had taken the responsibility for temporary 
investments. 
On an application of section 137 and 138 to the responsibilities owed to the 
company by the two directors in the finance committee it could be argued 
that a more lenient standard is being aiticulated on these two directors under 
the Companies Act 1993. It is submitted that section 137 (c) brings in a 
subjective, almost contractual connotation in the words "duties unde1iaken 
by the director" 29 which could be interpreted in this context as being that 
these two directors did not unde1take the responsibility of overseeing the 
tempora1y investment of the company as they believed in good faith that the 
chief executive and general manager had assumed responsibility for these 
transactions. They also had no knowledge that such reliance was 
unwananted. ' 0 
It could also be argued that applying section 138 (1) these two directors 
relied on an employee of the company who they believed on reasonable 
grounds to be reliable and competent in relation to the matters concerned. ie 
The chief executive, or the general manager or both. Thus it is submitted 
that section 138 in association with section 137 could quite easily impose a 
lesser duty of care on these two directors than what Romer J said was 
required of them in the Re City Equitable judgement. Romer J absolved 
29 
30 
See above pp20,2 I 
Section 138 (2) (c) 
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these two directors of liability only due to the requirement in the article 150 
of "wilful negligence" from the directors concerned. It appears that under 
section 137 such an outcome would still be possible despite there being no 
"wilfully negligent" provisions . 
As regards Romer J's findings that the board as a whole was negligent in 
allowing the slack procedures in safeguarding the tempora1y cash resources 
of the company which made it possible for the chief executive to actually 
dispose of the monies as he thought fit, it could be argued under section 137 
that a reasonable director of a company of the size of City Equitable could 
easily place reliance on the company officials to safeguard cash resources not 
in a state of pe1manent investment. However it is possible to expect of such 
a reasonable director who works .on a sub committee such as the finance 
committee, following the resolution by the finance committee to divest itself 
of the company's holdings in industrial securities, to make inqui1y as to the 
outcome of the implementation of such a decision. Even if it be as submitted 
earlier that section 138 would permit reliance on an employee for the task of 
making tempora1y investments the finance committee member would be 
required under section 137 (c) in view of the "duties unde11aken" in respect 
of permanent investment that such director makes inqui1y as to the 
implementation of the decision to invest in treasmy bills and war bonds. 
Hence section 137 would impose a similar standard to that applied by Romer 
J on the directors on the finance committee but not on the entire board for 
allowing the lack of accountability which made it possible for the chief 
executive's misfeasance to occur. Here again the section 137 standard of 
care required of the board as a whole is more lenient than Romer J in City 
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Equitable. The standard would be similar with respect to the directors on the 
finance committee. Thus it is submitted that it is possible to treat directors 
differently under the section 13 7 standard, but as a collective responsibility, 
the standards under 137 and 138 are more lenient than that articulated by 
Romer J. 
As regards the decision of inquiring into the repo11ed figures in the annual 
reports prior to recommending payment of dividend to shareholders, 
although an application of section 13 7 would require the reasonable director 
to take all reasonable care, it is possible that under section 138 the director 
could still rely on reports, statements and financial data supplied by 
employees of the company who he reasonably believes to be reliable and 
competent. In the case of City Equitable there was no ostensible reason to 
doubt this seeing that section 138 (2) only expects inqui1y to be made if the 
need for inqui1y is indicated by the circumstances. Romer J insisted on the 
need for obtaining a list of assets in each year. It appears that nothing in 
section 138 of the Companies Act 1993 would wanant that. Section 137 on 
the other hand with the "catch all" , all encompassing phrase " care, diligence 
and skill of a reasonable director" could wanant inqui1y into a list of assets 
in investigating a company's balance sheet in a specific year. Yet it cannot 
be said that these words in section 137 makes it an unambiguous requirement 
for a director to inquire into such detail , as section 138 pern1its reliance on 
third patties under ce11ain circumstances for such info1mation . Thus in 
applying the provisions of sections 137 and 138 to the facts of the transaction 
B related above and in comparing the holdings of Romer J it is submitted that 
the standard of care required under the Companies Act 1993 could again be 
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more lenient than that applied by Romer J and that the final outcome would 
be very similar under both standards . 
It is submitted that the words "Reasonable director" in section 137 is 
contradict01y to what is being said in the latter part of the section 137, 
closely followed by the content of section 138. 
This position should however, be examined under section 130 of the 
Companies Act 1993. 
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XI DELEGATION OF POWERS OF DIRECTORS 
A SECTION 130 
The Companies Act 1993 recognises the necessity for the board of directors 
to delegate some of its powers for the efficient running of the company. 
Section 130 (1) says: 
Subject to any restrictions in the constitution of the company, the 
board of a company may delegate to a committee of directors, a 
director or employee cfthe company, or any other person, any one or 
more o_fits pm1 •ers· other thaJJ its po111ers under any of the sections of 
this Act set out in the second schedule to this Act. 
Section 130 (2) says: 
A board that delegates a p0111er under subsection (J) of this section is 
responsible for the exercise cf the power by the delegate as [f the 
p011•er has heen exercised hy the board unless the board 
(a) Belie,,e on reasonahle grounds at all times before the exercise 
cf the pol1'er that the delegate 1110111d exercise the power in 
confhrmity 11 ·ith the duties imposed on directors of the 
company by this Act and the company's constitution and 
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(b) Has monitored, by means of reasonable methods properly 
used, the exercise of the power by the delegate. 
Section 130 does not fully absolve the board of liability when powers have 
been delegated. It states that the board that delegates a power under this 
section is responsible for the exercise of this power by the delegate as if the 
board was itself exercising the power and this responsibility could only be 
avoided if the board under subsection (a) believes on reasonable ground that 
the delegate will exercise the delegated powers in confo1mity with the 
directors duties under the Act and Constitution and (b) has monitored by 
reasonable methods the delegate's performance. 
It is well settled that the delegation of a function does not alone constitute 
compliance by a director with the director's duty of care obligations with 
respect to the function. 3 1 
In Re City Equitable Romer J said a director was justified in trusting the 
finance committee to perform properly the duties delegated to them. 
However he said the responsibility lay with the directors in the finance 
committee to control and safely manage the monies left for investment. It 
was not for those two directors in that finance committee to leave that 
function to the general manager of the company to decide upon the method 
31 American law institute - Principles of Corporate Governance in Part IV, 
p223 . 
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of investment of a company's cash resources. On an application of section 
130 of the Companies Act there are two issues in relation to the City 
Equitable facts. They are whether fiTstly the board as a whole could delegate 
the function of investments to the finance committee and take no 
responsibility thereafter. Secondly, if the finance committee could leave the 
function of tempora1y investments to the general manager of the company. 
On the first issue although the board could under section 130 delegate the 
investment fw1ction to the finance committee it will be required to "believe 
on reasonable grounds at all times before the exercise of the power that the 
delegate will exercise the power in confonnity with the duties imposed on 
directors by the Act and the company's constitution" .32 In City Equitable the 
delegation was to a finance commi~ee comprising of ve1y competent people 
in their respective fields. Delegation would be pennissible in this instance 
as the belief "at all times before the exercise of the power" would be 
meritorious of the fact that the power would be exercised properly as 
required by this section. However under section 130 (2) (b) the board would 
have had to monitor by means of reasonable methods properly used, the 
exercise of the power by the delegate. In the judgment of City Equitable 
Romer J absolved the board as a whole from liability in respect of the 
tempora1y investments. Also as submitted earlier this would be a possible 
outcome under sections 13 7 and 138. In contrast to this, under section 130 
the City Equitable board as a whole could not be fully absolved of liability 
32 Section l 30(2) (a) . 
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as it did not comply with the requirement of "monitoring by reasonable 
methods the exercise of the power by the finance committee" .33 What is 
meant by the words "monitored by reasonable methods" in this section is not 
at all clear. However it can be quite easily contended that section 130 
imposes a higher standard than that a1ticulated by Romer J in respect of the 
board as a whole towards its responsibilities over the function of the delegate, 
as the board had literally washed its hands off the finance committee on the 
subject of investments generally. This will not be acceptable conduct under 
the provisions of section I 30. 
In the second instance of delegation in the City Equitable context where the 
finance committee left the task of tempora1y investment to the general 
manager of the company it could be said that on an application of section 130 
of the Companies Act a similar finding to that aiticulated by Romer J would 
be inevitable. Romer J said the two directors were in breach of their duty to 
leave a function that was delegated to them as he understood it, to an 
employee of the company with no control over the function . Section 130 
would impose a similar duty on these two directors under subsection (2) (b) 
requiring the delegates actions to be monitored by reasonable methods 
properly used. 
33 Section 130(2)(b) 
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It is submitted therefore that section 130 would apply a higher standard of 
care on the facts of City Equitable than Romer J. The Scottish Institute of 
Chaitered Accountants said in its rep01t: 
A board of directors is normally permitted by the Articles of 
Associat;on to delegate its .functions e;rher to management or to 
commillees of directors. A danger is that the use of such committees 
may create, in the minds- c?f'some members of the board, the idea that 
the responsibilihes c?f' the directors vary depending on whether they 
are involved in a particular commillee. This is not so. The purpose 
ofcommillees is to go into greater depth than is pos.s)ble in full board 
meetings, certain ,s.rnes for which the full board retains 
responsibility. 34 
The New Zealand legislation appears to follow this line of thought in the 
wording of section 130. 
In the New Zealand Comts the extent of delegation of a board was 
considered in the case of Jagwar Holdings Ltd v Julian and Ors.35 
34 
35 
Repo1t on Directors' Responsibilities for Financial Statements, Institute of 
Chartered Accountants Scotland, Ch3 plO. 
(1992) 6NZCLC 68,040 . 
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In this case potential investors in recently listed Fullers Corporation Ltd 
(FCL) of which the defendants were directors were sent a "Share Package" 
which contained a Corporate profile and a Financial Profile. The profiles 
consisted of profit forecasts of the company, an Auditors Rep01t signed by 
Price Waterhouse (PW) and net asset positions among other representations. 
All documents were prepared by senior staff at Fullers in consultation with 
Price Waterhouse. 
An invitation was extended by one of the directors of Fullers Corporation to 
the chainnan of Jagwar Holdings Ltd (Jagwar) to take up shares in the Fullers 
Corporation float and a share package was sent to Jagwar Holdings Ltd. 
Jagwar Holdings Ltd did not take up the share offer at the time of the float, 
but immediately following the .float Jagwar Holdings Ltd entered into 
discussions with Fullers Corporation Ltd about purchasing shares. The price 
was ruTived at between Jagwar's financial analyst and directors of Fullers 
Corporation following which Jagwar offered to take 20% of Fullers 
Corporation's capital. 
A year later Fullers Corporation was in major financial difficulty and it 
became appru·ent that the share package sent to potential investors including 
Jagwar consisted of inaccurate profit forecasts and that estimates given to 
Jagwru·'s financial analysts by the directors of Fullers Corporation were false. 
Jagwru· sued Fullers Corporation and its directors in negligence and under the 
Fair Trading Act for breach of section 9 alleging misleading and deceptive 
conduct. 
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As regard the inaccuracies contained in the financial profile sent to potential 
investors the directors contended that they had no pati in the collation or 
formulation of the inforniation, all the work being done by the financial 
controller of Fullers Corporation . Thorpe J was accepting of the fact that the 
directors had relied on the financial controller who in turn had consulted the 
auditors to ensure that the forecasts were properly calculated. However in 
considering if the directors were entitled to leave the preparation and 
checking of forecasts to the financial contro11er and auditors, Thorpe J said 
it had to depend on the extent of the director's obligation to infonn 
themselves about their company's financial position and the extent to which 
they could properly delegate such business to other directors or officers of 
the company. 
Thorpe J harked back to the standard interpretation of the Re City Equitable 
standard of care expected of directors in canying out their duties ie that 
directors must exhibit the degree of skill reasonably to be expected from a 
person of his knowledge and experience having regard of the circumstances 
pe1iaining to his responsibilities and that if acting honestly he is not liable for 
eITors ofjudgernent. 36 His honour also considered the comments of the Earl 
of Halsbmy LC in Dovey V Corey. 37 
36 See above 1135 at 6-8,074. 
37 (1901) AC477 p486. 
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Failure to allow directors to delegate some of their responsibilities 
would render anything like an intelligent devolution of labour 
impossible and the business of life could not go on if people could not 
/rust those 111ho are put in a position of trust for the express purpose 
of a/fending to details of management. 
Agreeing with Romer's interpretation and applying these principles Thorpe 
J held that there was no evidence that the defendant directors should have 
suspected that their financial controller was anything other than a competent 
and reliable officer of the company with appropriate qualifications for his 
position and therefore it was not a dereliction of duty for the directors to 
delegate the responsibility for compiling the forecasts to the financial 
controller especially so as he was confening with the auditors. 
Applying section 130 of the Companies Act to the situations above firstly 
dealing with the facts of Jagwar v Julian38 it would appear that even if 
delegation per se would not be objectionable under the Act, section 130 (2) 
(b) requires the board to monitor by means of reasonable methods properly 
used, the exercise of the power by the delegate. The mere fact that the 
financial conh·oller was well qualified and considered competent, together 
with the fact that he consulted the auditors of the company may not be 
sufficient w1der the Act as a reasonable method of monitoring the delegate's 
function. 
38 Above n35 . 
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In the case of Re City Equitable Romer J absolved the directors outside the 
finance committee of liability and held the function of investments were 
properly delegated to the finance committee. Here again an application of 
section I 30 of the Companies Act would require the board as a whole to use 
reasonable methods in monitoring the functions of the delegate, in this 
instance the finance committee. The section 130 (2) b requirement advocates 
abstaining from the "washing hands off' stance adopted in the facts set out 
above. This is in keeping with the dissenting judgement of Kirby Pin Metal 
Manufactures Ltd v Lewis.39 
It must also be noted that the two exceptions to section 130 (2) of the Act are 
available only in combination with each other. Hence the directors must 
satisfy the comt that they believed the delegate at all times would exercise 
the power in confom1ity with the directors' duties and the directors must have 
monitored by reasonable methods the delegate's exercise of power. This is a 
higher standard than the common law has been up to now on the subject of 
delegation. 
39 (1988) 6ACLC725 . 
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B RELATIONSHIP OF SECTION 130 TO SECTION 138 OF 
COMPANIES ACT 1993 
Despite being required to "monitor" a delegate's function "by reasonable 
methods" in section 130 which as submitted earlier is a higher standard of 
care provision of this section, the director could avail himself to the defence 
available under section 138 that such monitoring was not necessary "as the 
circumstances did not indicate such action was necessary" . It is possible to 
arrive at a similar conclusion to that of Thorpe J's judgement in applying 
section 138 to the facts of Jagwar v Julian .40 Section 138 pennits reliance 
on inf01mation and data submitted by employees who the director "believed 
on reasonable grounds to be reliable and competent in relation to matters 
concerned" .41 In the facts of J<;tgwar v Julian this was the case with the 
financial controller who was nonnally quite competent. 
This makes this whole area of delegation indefinite and uncertain. Section 
13 0 (2) (b) conveys that the delegate's actions should be monitored at all 
times through reasonable methods . It does not describe or explain such 
monitoring as to when such monito1ing should be done for example by saying 
in words "when circumstances indicate such monitoring is necessaiy etc" .... 
However fu1ther on under section 138 (1) reliance could be placed on a 
delegate for repo1ts and statements and under 138 (2) (b) inquiry should only 
.JO Above 1135. 
-ll Section 38( I) (a) 
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be made "if the need for inqui1y is indicated by the circumstances" . This 
points to an anomaly which clearly needs to be clarified. This brings an 
element of unce1tainty to the area of delegation and reliance on information 
from committees of directors, employees etc. 
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C USE OF INFORMATION AND ADVICE 
Section 138 of the Companies Act says 
138 (1) ... A director of a company, when exercising powers or 
per.forming duties as a director, may rely on reports, 
statements, and.financial data and other in.formation 
prepared or supplied, and on professional or expert 
advice gil'en by any of the .follo1Fing persons: 
(a) An employee cf the company whom the director believes on 
reasonable grounds· to be reliable and competent in relation to 
the matters concerned: 
(b) A professional adviser or expert in relation to matters which 
the director believes on reasonable grounds· to be within the 
person's professional or expert competence. 
(c) Any other director or committee of directors upon which the 
director did not serve in relation to matters within the 
director's or committee's designate authority. 
138 (2)..... subsection(!) cfthis section applies to a director only 
[l the director. 
(a) Acts in good.faith and 
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(b) Makes proper inquiry where the need for inquiry is indicated 
by the circumstances; and 
(c) Has no knmF!edge that such reliance is unwarranted 
In the discussion above on the City Equitable facts in transaction B it was 
submitted that the standard of care required from directors under section 137 
together with section 138 in relation to reliance on employees for reports and 
financial data etc could well be a lesser standard-12 than that pronounced by 
Romer J who required directors to look behind repmied figures submitted by 
the company officials in the annual accounts in requi1ing a list of assets prior 
to the directors recommending a dividend to the company's shareholders. 
Later on in the discussion relating to section 130 of the Act it was submitted 
that the standards under the present legislation would require a higher 
standard than that applied by Romer J in requiring directors to monitor the 
actions of the delegate. 43 Hence it could be deduced that section 138 
contributes to a certain extent to this ambiguity in the standards imposed by 
the Act. 
Section 138 by itself gives directors the right to rely on employees, 
committees of directors, experts and advisers which is necessa1y as quoted 
earlier in the words of the Earl of Halsbmy "for an intelligent devolution of 
.J2 
43 
See above p3 l 
See above p36 . 
-15 
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labour" to take place in the company. 4-1 The inclusion of section 138 in the 
New Zealand legislation has its origins from the United States. The 
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance says in: 45 
Section -1-. 03 
In performing his or her d11ty andfimctions a director who acts in 
good faith and reasonably believes that reliance is ll'arranted, is 
entitled to rely on: 
(a) The decisions j11dgments and performance ... of a duly 
authorised commillee cf the board on which the director does 
not ser11e, 11·ith respect to matters delegated to that committee 
provided that the director reasonably believes, the committee 
merits confidence 
Section -1-. 02 
In pe1:forming his or her duty and.functions, a director or officer who 
acts in good.faith and reasonably believes that reliance is warranted, 
is entitled to rely on in.fbrmation, opinions, reports, statements 
Above n37 . 
American Law Institute "Principles of Corporate Governance - Analysis and 
Recommendations" Draft 1992. 
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(including .financial statements .... .) decisions judgements and 
pe,formance within the scope of Section -I.OJ ...... . 
It is submitted that although section 138 of the Companies Act 1993 pe1fonns 
a vital function, yet in combination with the standard of care required in 
section 137 in the words "must exercise the care, diligence and skill of a 
reasonable director" it appears to confuse the standard of care required of the 
director. Under the US equivalent of section 13 7 as expressed in section 
4.01 of the Principles of Corporate Governance it says:-16 
-16 
-/.. OJ (a) A director or offlcer has a duty to the corporation to 
pe(form the director's or officer's fimctions in good 
faith, in a mr;mner that he or she reasonably believes to 
be in the best interests of the corporation and with the 
care that an ordinarily prudent person would 
reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position 
under similar circ11mstances ..... . . 
(I) The duty in .rnhsection (a) includes the obligation to make, or 
cause to be made, an inquiry when, but only when the 
circumstances 11•01i/d alert a reasonable director ...... to the 
need there.few .... . . 
Above n45 . 
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It can be said under the US Model that the standard in the provision noted 
above in 4.01 conelates easily to the standard in 4.02-17 which pe1mits 
reliance on repo1is etc and only requires the care of an ordinarily prudent 
person in 4.01 which appears to conelate and co-exist on the same level 
playing field. 
In the ew Zealand context section 138 appears to require a different 
standard to section 137 which by itself alone has similar ambiguities within 
the section. It is also submitted that section 138 does not appear to conelate 
to the standard of care required under the delegation provision in section 130 
as section l 30 does not say when the delegate's actions should be monitored. 
It is submitted section 138 is therefore not able to serve its function as it is 
not a stand alone provision of the Act and in combination with section 137 
and section 130 it is not able to provide the facility for intelligent devolution 
oflabour, for which specific purpose it was incorporated into the legislation. 
~7 See above p53 . 
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XII THE DEEM ED DIRECTOR 
The Companies Act 1993 under section 126 defines a director as not only 
someone who is by appointment a director, but also other categories of 
persons who could be deemed as directors for the pati they play in the 
process of decision making by the director. The director is defined as: 
• 
• 
A person occupying the position of director. 
A person is accordance with whose directions a director is 
accustomed to act. 
• A person with whose instructions the board is accustomed to 
act. 
• A person who exercises or is entitled to conh·ol the exercise of 
power which would nom1ally fall to the board. 
• A person to whom the directors powers have been delegated 
with the person's consent or a person who exercises that power 
with the consent of the board. 
• A person in accordance with whose directions directors maybe 
required to act. 
57 
The Companies Act 1955 on the other hand defined two categories only. 
They were 
( 1) A person occupying the position of director. 
(2) A person in accordance with whose directions or instructions 
the persons occupying the position of director are accustomed 
to act. 
Under the expanded definition of the word "director" in the 1993 legislation 
the delegate who exercises power under delegation from the board would be 
exercising the power as a director itself Fo11owing the discussion above in 
this paper on the directors responsibilities with regard to delegation, the 1993 
Act imposes a similar responsibility on the delegate in the capacity of 
deemed director. It is questionable if because the delegate assumes 
responsibilities as deemed director for his or her actions whether the 1993 
Act would distance the main director itself fom1 liability for the actions of the 
delegate who is now deemed a director under the expanded definition of the 
1993 legislation. It is also quite open to interpretation as to where the duty 
of care responsibility i.e personal liability stops in the corporate 
establishment's hierarchy under this expanded definition. If the delegate per 
se is a deemed director then he or she should be complying with sections 130, 
137 and 138 with regard to that delegation in relation to his or her own 
delegate. In these circumstances would the director by appointment be 
relieved of his responsibility of care? Tt is submitted that this would not be 
5 
the spirit of the legislation i.e. the director would still be held to his/her 
responsibility under sections 13 7 and 130. 
In the Principles of Corporate Governance interpreting the US law as it 
stands today, the duty of care provisions were drafted to include the director 
and the officer. 48 Whereas in ew Zealand the officer would normally be 
exempted from personal liability under the law of vicarious liability, except 
in the case of the officer acting in the capacity of deemed director under the 
present legislation . However it is contended that the director v officer gap 
is nanowed down with the deemed director provisions in the Act and it is 
unclear as to where the deemed director's responsibility of care ends. 
48 Section 4.01 Principles of Corporate Governance, American Law Institute. 
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XIII SOME RECENT DECISIONS AND AN APPLICATION OF 
COMPANIES ACT 1993 
The qualifications in section 13 7 whereby the extent of the duty of care 
required from the "reasonable director" would take into account the nature 
of the company, the nature of the decision and the position, nature and 
responsibilities undertaken by the director are commonly refeITed to as the 
Awa qualifications . These qualifications were espoused by Rogers CJ in 
Awa Ltd v Daniel.-19 In this action directors duties were being examined 
against a background where Awa Ltd were suing the company's auditors in 
negligence and the auditors claimed the directors of the company were 
contributorily negligent in not closely supervising the company's foreign 
exchange operation which appeared to be run single handedly by the manager 
in charge of the operation. Rogers CJ held that non executive directors could 
not be held liable for negligence, in the words: 50 
-19 
50 
ft is an anachmnism to expect non exec11/i1 1e directors, meeting once 
a month to contrilmte anything much more than decisfons on 
questions c?f"policy and in the case of large corporations, only major 
policy. This necessari~y means that in the execution of policy, senior 
management is in the tme sense of the 111ord exercising the powers of 
(1992) JO ACLC933 . 
N49 above 988 . 
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decision and of management which in less complex days used to be 
reserved to the board of directors. 
He also said the directors had no reason to believe that the policies laid down 
by the board in relation to foreign exchange operations were not being 
followed. Neither the chief executive nor the auditors ever mentioned this 
to the board. The directors were in the absence of knowledge entitled to rely 
on the senior management that systems of control were in place. He 
concluded that only if they had a knowledge of the true facts that any 
inaction on their part could have been described as negligent. However, 
Rogers CJ maintained that merely because standards of care may va1y in 
individual cases does not mean that there is a variation in duty which would 
disqualify the applicability of the general law of negligence. Rogers CJ was 
interpreting that the common law standard of negligence was applicable in 
subjective circumstances. 
It is this approach by Roger CJ that has been adopted in the section 137 duty 
of care provisions where a common law standard of care is being expected 
of the "reasonable director" in subjective circumstances having regard to the 
nature of the company, the decision and the nature of responsibilities 
undertaken by the director. 
Considering the factual circumstances m Awa Ltd it is submitted that 
although it is possible to anive at a similar conclusion to the decision in Awa 
in applying sections 137 and 138, section 130 could pose a problem as it 
requires the delegate's actions to be monitored by reasonable methods. 
51 
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Whether the auditors function in Awa Ltd was a reasonable method of 
monit01ing under section 130 or whether anything else should have triggered 
the monitoring process is unclear under section 130. The directors in Awa 
could be held to have been negligent of their duties under the Companies Act 
1993. 
Another decision where the director's duty of care was considered is 
Greyburn v Laing.51 The action came before Gallen Jin the High Comi in 
New Zealand. The plaintiff in this case was a cha1iered accountant who had 
been a professional non-executive director in many public companies with 
considerable expe1ience. He was a director of C01y Wright and Salmon Ltd 
(CWS) and this action was brought by him against Mr Laing who was 
appointed official liquidator of CvVS following the technical insolvency of 
the company. Greyburn (G) was seeking an injunction to prevent Laing (L) 
from proceeding against him in negligence as director of CWS. CWS had 
seven directors including Mr Philpott (P) who was group managing director. 
On a proposed date for a board meeting G was not able to attend and had 
notified the chainnan of his prior commitment to travel overseas. At the 
meeting the rest of the board had ratified transactions proposed by P with 
regard to issuing a debenture stock to Elders Finance, Hongkong and a 
guarantee for bonowings of Razor Corporation . A subsequent meeting was 
called after the return of G and he was not able to attend again this time. 
Minutes of the previous meeting were read out at this meeting in G's absence. 
[1991] INZLR483 . 
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At the following board meeting it was business as usual but prior to the next 
meeting the chaim1an infonned G that the group managing director had made 
some inter company bonowings and that he (the chainnan) had issued a 
warning to the chief executive and infonned G that he was satisfied it was a 
one off transaction. At a subsequent board meeting when questions were 
raised about CWS' involvement in certain aircraft sales the group managing 
director convinced the board that it did not involve CWS in ownership or 
liabilities. Subsequently it became apparent that CWS did own an aircraft 
involving a complex scheme of transactions and that P had repeatedly 
misinfonned the board about the involvement of CWS in aircraft sales. 
Gallen J applied the principles of Romer Jin City Equitable and said that the 
standard of care should be assessed i~1 relation to the particular 
responsibilities of the directors concerned towards the company, the nature 
of the company and the nature of the directorship . In response to the 
liquidator's position that G should have been put on inqui1y when he first 
received board papers about the guarantee and debenture even though he was 
not able to attend the meeting, Gallen J said there was nothing in the material 
which disclosed the pmticular transactions and G did not have an oppo1tunity 
to raise any concerns as when such an opportunity arose G was not present 
and it was untenable to raise (any) concerns on the matter two meetings 
later. 
Gallen J said affixing the company seal to the transactions proposed by P 
was a joint responsibility of the board and that G did not have any special 
obligation about any of the transactions. On an application of the Companies 
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Act 1993 it is possible to say that even though section 13 7 requires the 
director to "exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonable director 
would exercise", section l 3 7 ( c) would have provided G with some comf01t 
as to the nature of the responsibilities unde1taken by him. As stated by 
Gallen J, G did not unde1take any special obligations in respect of either 
transaction . Section 138 would also provide a defence to G as the board 
papers did not disclose anything to arouse suspicion and G could rely on his 
fellow directors to make inquires, which in fact they did. Therefore it is 
possible that the outcome under section 13 7 would be similar to that 
interpreted by Gallen J under the companies Act 1955. 
Thus the duty of care provisions under the Companies Act 1993 could 
impose a higher responsibility on the direct~ffs of Awa, but on the facts of 
Greyburn v Laing the outcome could be similar. 
52 
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XIV INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE 
In view of the discussions above on the duty of care responsibilities of 
directors and those in deemed director positions it is most appropriate that the 
Companies Act 1994 provides the oppo1tunity for indemnifying and effecting 
insurance cover on the director by the company as long as the company's 
c~mstitution permits such indemnity and insurance. 52 Such a provision was 
not available in the Act of 1955. The ambiguities in the duty of care 
expected from a director as discussed above, would need the interpretation 
of the comts in aniving at clarification of the law as cunently submitted. For 
defending such proceedings through the comts it is necessa1y to have the 
provisions in regard to indemnity and insurance included in the Act. 
Section 62, Companies Act 1993 . 
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XV CONCLUSION 
In the foregoing analysis of the sections 137, 138 and 130 of the Companies 
Act 1993 it is apparent that there are troublesome ambiguities in the standard 
of care required of directors. City Equitable, if decided under the Companies 
Act 1993 with or without the wilful negligence provisions of Article 150 
could not be clearly said to have either relieved or imposed a greater liability 
on the director. As seen in the analysis above on ce1tain fronts the act 
imposes a higher duty of care and yet on other transactions it is able to 
require a lesser duty of care than that required in City Equitable. This 
ambiguity in the Act makes it unworkable and corporate responsibilities are 
yet undefined . The debate as to the quantum of care required under the Act 
is likely to continue . 
Section 130 and 13 7 are clearly in need of definition as to who or what is a 
"reasonable director" , when and what should be done in "monitoring by 
reasonable methods" the actions of a delegate. The law whether more 
rigorous or lenient should at least be clear for compliance or non compliance 
to occur. 
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